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THIS IS A BROAD-BRUSH REVIEW OF INCOME SUPPORT in the Canadian fed-
eration, written in the spirit of Ian Stewart, whose versatility and energy far
exceed mine, but whose social values and commitment to macroeconomic
stabilization and social policy I fully share. There are three sections. In the
first section, I place Canada’s public expenditure on income support in inter-
national perspective. In the second, I highlight the significant variation in
spending on income support that exists across Canadian provinces. In the
third section, I single out a couple of areas where progress would seem desir-
able in Canada on the basis of the international and interprovincial context
presented in the first two sections. The two areas are old age and family pol-
icy.
1 For comments and advice, I am greatly indebted to Keith Banting, John Rich-
ards, the two editors, and participants in the CSLS session on New Directions
for Intelligent Government in Canada at the June 2011 annual meeting of the
Canadian Economics Association at the University of Ottawa.212 New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada
Income Support in International Perspective
Let me begin with the international perspective. The OECD distributes
government social expenditure into nine categories: old age, survivors, inca-
pacity, family, unemployment, social assistance and social services, health,
housing, and active labour market policies. All areas include in-kind benefits
(such as residential care, home help, child care, etc.) as well as cash transfers.2
In this paper, I take “income support” to mean aggregate national spending in
the first six areas. Hence, health, housing, and active labour market policies
are excluded from consideration.
 To illustrate with Canadian data, “old age” includes the Old Age Security
pension, the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS), Canada Pension Plan
(CPP) and Quebec Pension Plan (QPP) retirement pensions and the regular
spouse allowance. “Survivors” comprises the widowed spouses allowance, the
surviving spouse’s pension, the orphan’s benefit and the death benefit. “Inca-
pacity” adds up the disabled contributor’s child benefit, the regular disability
pension, the veterans’ pension, workers’ compensation, and Employment
Insurance (EI) sickness benefits. “Family” refers to the Canada Child Tax Ben-
efit, EI and Quebec parental leave benefits, and in-kind childcare benefits.
“Unemployment” combines regular, fishing, work sharing and older workers
adjustment benefits. “Social assistance and social services” bring together the
GST/HST tax credits, provincial and municipal social assistance and social
services, federal social assistance and social services for registered Indians, and
in-kind services for new migrants and refugees.3
In 2007, for the 22 OECD countries that are listed in Table 1,4 old age
accounted for about 50 per cent of total spending on income support on aver-
2 Refundable tax credits are included in cash transfers, but other elements of
income taxation are not.
3 In OECD taxonomy, social assistance and social services is a residual category
called “other social policy areas”.
4 There are 34 member countries in the OECD. The group of 22 countries in the
table excludes those that are either very small (Iceland, Luxemburg), emerging
(Chile, Mexico, Turkey), or in transition (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Israel, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia). The year 2007 is the last one for which
OECD data are currently available. Use of this year therefore avoids the cyclical















age, family and incapacity 15 per cent each, unemployment and survivors 7 per
cent each, and social assistance and social services 5 per cent.5 Chart 1 breaks
down Canada’s expenditure on income support into these six categories. The
OECD estimates that Canada spent $142 billion in income support in 2007,
equivalent to 9.3 per cent of nominal GDP. Together, old age and social assis-
tance and services accounted for 69 per cent of the total, followed in decreas-
ing order by family, incapacity, unemployment, and survivors.
How does the Canadian income support/GDP ratio compare to those of
other OECD countries? Canada is among the small spenders. As Table 1 indi-
cates, in 2007 Canada was near the bottom of 22 OECD countries in terms of
spending on income support. Canada ranked 20th out of 22 OECD countries,
with only the United States and Korea lower. The United Kingdom, New
5 Canada is an outlier here, with 28 per cent of its spending on income support
attributed to social assistance and social services in 2007. Most likely, the
OECD found it impossible to distribute provincial and municipal social services
properly across the other five areas, and so left them in this residual category.
Chart 1
Breakdown of Spending on Income
Support into Six Categories, Canada, 2007
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Zealand, Ireland, and Australia were ranked slightly above Canada. Sweden,
France, Austria, Belgium Denmark, Finland, Italy and Germany were the top
eight spenders.
Table 1
Expenditure on Income Support in 22 OECD Countries, 2007, 
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21 United States 8.8
22 South Korea 4.1
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How has income support evolved internationally over time? Chart 2 shows
that, as a group, advanced countries increased their effort in supporting
incomes until the mid-1990s. Since then, the average effort has remained on a
plateau around 14 per cent of GDP. The chart singles out one of the top
spenders (Sweden) as well as two small spenders (Canada and the United
States). In the United States, spending on income support as percentage of
GDP has been low (9 per cent of GDP), but basically trendless, throughout
the 1980-2007 period. The trend was upward until the mid-1990s in Sweden
(up to 22 per cent of GDP) and in Canada (up to 11 per cent of GDP). Since
then, it has declined somewhat in these two countries. After 1995, Canada and
Sweden both recovered from long and painful recessions and introduced pro-
grammatic changes. In Canada, unemployment insurance at the federal level
and social assistance in provinces were main targets of reform.
It is instructive to compare government expenditure in Sweden, Canada and
the United States by income support category. The OECD estimates that in
Chart 2
Government Expenditure on Income Support in Sweden, Canada, 
United States and OECD Average, 1980-2007 (per cent of GDP)
Note: The OECD average is the unweighted average of same 22 countries as in Table 1.
Source: OECD.Stat Databank.216 New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada
2007 the amounts spent for old age were 9 per cent of GDP in Sweden, 3.8 per
cent in Canada and 3.2 per cent in the United States.6 Sweden’s greater effort
is due partly to the share of its 65-and-over population being 40 per cent larger
than in Canada and the United States, and partly to more generous pensions
and an extensive network of residential care facilities and home-help services.
Despite spending only 40 per cent as much as Sweden for old age, Canada has
targeted the low-income elderly successfully, thanks mainly to the GIS.
Another area where Sweden spends a much greater fraction of its GDP than
the United States or Canada is incapacity-related income support. Disability
pensions, paid sick leaves and in-kind residential care and home help are all
more developed in Sweden. Family benefits are also larger in that country, not
because family allowances are higher, but because parental leaves are more
extended and generous and there is universal low-fee childcare. Access to gen-
erous unemployment insurance benefits is also easier in Sweden, but continu-
ation of benefits beyond a certain point is generally conditional on
participation in an active labour market program.
Income Support in Interprovincial Perspective
Is there a connection between the degree of income support offered by a
country as a whole and its status as a federation or a unitary state? Political
decentralization could affect the average level of the income support/GDP
ratio or the dispersion of this ratio across component states. Simple regression
analysis of the data provides no evidence of a significant positive or negative
correlation between the average country-level of the income support/GDP
ratio and the fact of being a federation, which I assume to be the case for 8 of
the 22 countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Austria, Spain, Swit-
6 The official OECD estimate for old age support in the United States is 5.3 per
cent of GDP. However, this figure includes the retirement pensions federal,
state and local public employees receive from their employers over and above
their Social Security pensions. Removing this item from the U.S. estimate to
make it comparable to the Swedish and Canadian estimates gives 3.2 per cent
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zerland and the United States).7 More sophisticated multivariate explorations
tend to conclude that political decentralization does affect income support
negatively.8
Be that as it may, federations obviously have the theoretical potential for
allowing greater dispersion of income support across their component states.
The actual outcome depends on how constitutional powers are shared, how
large and how differentiated federal transfers are across states, how decentral-
ized the power of taxation is, and to what extent it is actually exploited. Charts
7T h e  r e s u l t  i s :
INCSUPP/GDPi = 14.1 – 0.7*FEDERATIONi,  R2 = 0.01 ,
           (1.1)  (1.7)
where INCSUPP/GDPi = 2007 income support/GDP ratio in country i, FEDERATIONi =
1 if country i is a federation and 0 otherwise (i = 1, 2,…, 22), R = correlation
coefficient, and standard errors are in parentheses. The non-significance of the
correlation holds whether Spain is considered to be a federation or not, and
whether the United States is included in the sample or not.
8 See, for instance, Swank (2002). Swank further argues that globalization has
not contributed to the retrenchment of developed welfare states. 
Chart 3
Total Nonfederal Government Expenditure as a Percentage 
of Provincial GDP, 10 Canadian Provinces, 2007
Source: Statistics Canada.218 New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada
3 and 4 respectively indicate how variable total nonfederal expenditure and
income support spending were across Canadian provinces in 2007.
Chart 3 first pictures interprovincial differences in total nonfederal expendi-
ture. All current and capital expenditures of provincial and local governments
and Canada and Quebec Pension Plans are included in this aggregate, not only
expenditure on income support.9 The range goes from 16 per cent of GDP in
Alberta to 34 per cent in Prince Edward Island. This variance is large.10 The
chart also underlines the important fact that total nonfederal spending/GDP
ratios in the three Maritime Provinces and Quebec significantly exceed the
9 For interprovincial comparisons to be valid, either CPP/QPP spending should
be included in the total expenditure of every province, or it should be excluded
everywhere. The first of these two options is retained here. This has an impact
of the heights of the bars in Chart 3, but a negligible effect on their disper-
sion across provinces, which is the object of scrutiny. 
10 The dispersion of government spending/GDP ratios across provinces is magni-
fied somewhat by per capita GDP being very low in Prince Edward Island and
very high in Alberta. Nevertheless, the dispersion remains large even if one
takes this into account.
Chart 4
Provincial and Local Expenditure on Social Assistance, 
Workers’Compensation and Other Social Services as Percentage of 
Provincial GDP, 10 Canadian Provinces, 2007
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national average. It is well-known that these four provinces receive federal
equalization payments. These federal transfers represent a larger fraction of
their provincial GDP than is the case for provinces that do not receive equaliza-
tion payments. Table 2 further shows that the contribution of above-average
federal transfers to above-average nonfederal spending/GDP ratios is much
larger in the Maritimes than in Quebec. In 2007, 96 per cent of the high nonfed-
eral spending/GDP ratio in the Maritimes came from above-average federal
transfers. In contrast, Quebec financed its above-average nonfederal spending/
GDP ratio largely through above-average own-source taxation. Only 16 per
cent came from above-average federal transfers.
Chart 5
Absolute Poverty Rate, 10 provinces, 2007
(percentage of population in households whose after-tax income 
does not allow them to purchase a modest basket of goods and 
services)
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Table 2
Contributions of Above-average Federal Transfers and Above-average 
Own-source Taxation to Above-average Nonfederal Spending in the 
Maritime Provinces and Quebec, 2007
(percentages of GDP)
Note: The Maritime Provinces include Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.
“Own-source taxation” includes straight tax revenue, income from government enter-
prises, and borrowing (which amounts to postponed future own-source taxation).
Source: Calculations based on Statistics Canada’s Provincial and Territorial Economic
Accounts: Data Tables, Cat. no. 13-018-X (CANSIM table 384-0004), November 2010.
Contribution from: Maritime Provinces Quebec
Above-average federal transfers (%) 96 16
Above-average own-source taxation (%) 4 84
Total (%) 100 100
Chart 6
After-Tax Purchasing Power of Individuals in Economic Families with 
Two Persons or More Belonging to the Lowest Regional Quintile of 
Adjusted Family Income, 2007
(national average=100)
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Chart 4 turns to interprovincial differences in income support spending. It
shows that the Quebec exception carries into this area. While most provinces
spent about 3 per cent of their GDP on nonfederal income support in 2007,
the percentage in Quebec was 5 per cent, which is $6 billion more than if it had
conformed to the national average. Manitoba is also somewhat above average
at almost 3.5 per cent, and Alberta is below average at 2 per cent. Do these
interprovincial differences in income support lead to concrete results in terms
of lower poverty rates? There is no fool-proof evidence. I only have two sug-
gestive observations to draw from absolute poverty rates and the position of
the lowest disposable income quintile across regions of Canada.
Absolute poverty should be low if the province is very rich, does not have
conspicuously large pockets of deep poverty, and/or provides solid support to
low incomes. It can be seen in Chart 5 that, in 2007 again, absolute poverty is
low in rich Alberta, and is held down by income support spending in Quebec
and Manitoba.11 At the other end, the challenging problem of high poverty in
British Columbia emerges clearly.
Chart 6 in turn shows that after-tax purchasing power of the lowest income
quintile also varies significantly across Canadian regions, with the Prairies and
Quebec again doing significantly better than the national average.12 Quebec’s
commitment to social policy has been made concrete by a number of measures
that have been adopted after 1995: the Prescription Drug Insurance Plan, the
Reduced-Contribution Educational Childcare Program, the Child Assistance
Measure, the Work Premium, the Parental Insurance Plan, pay equity legisla-
tion, and a policy of maintaining the minimum wage around 47 per cent of the
average wage. The province’s effort to step up the fight against poverty was
11 The absolute poverty rates reported in Chart 5 are from Human Resources and
Skills Development Canada, Low Income in Canada: 2000-2007, Using the Mar-
ket Basket Measure, Final Report, Publication SP-909-07-09E, August 2009,
Tables 8a to 8j.
12 Average regional after-tax incomes of families in the first quintile (adjusted
for family size) are from Statistics Canada, Income in Canada 2009, Cat. no.
75-202-X (CANSIM table 202-0706), June 2011. Statistics Canada calculates
these from its Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID). I further adjust
the numbers by the relevant inter-city indexes of consumer retail prices based
on Statistics Canada, The Consumer Price Index, Cat. no. 62-0001-X (CANSIM
table 326-0015), March 2009.222 New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada
enshrined in its 2002 Act to Combat Poverty and Social Exclusion. This has
helped focus political discussion and has generated obligations for govern-
ment in the area of anti-poverty policy.
Two areas where progress could be made
Based on the international and interprovincial comparisons I have pre-
sented, I want to conclude by singling out two areas where intelligent govern-
ment could find new directions for income support in Canada. They pertain to
old age and family. I have a few remarks to offer on old age policy, and a larger
set of observations on family policy.
In the old age area, there does not seem to be a need for a broad-based increase
in government cash benefits. But an important challenge arises from the incipient
explosion of demand for residential care and home help. The rising pressure orig-
inates from population aging. According to Statistics Canada’s medium-growth
scenario,13 by 2035 the 65-and-over population will be twice as large as today, and
by mid-century the 85-and-over population will be four times as large as today. In
addition to putting our healthcare system to severe test, this will lead to a sharp
increase in older Canadians’ needs for residential care and home help services.
In this respect, two key developments are, first, that the boomers have two to
three times fewer children than current and past older Canadians to take care of
them when their physical and mental condition deteriorates; and second, that 85
years old is an age beyond which more than half of persons suffer from severe
chronic ailments such as Alzheimer’s disease. These two trends will likely lead to
an explosion of demand for long-term residential and home care. Access to this
kind of continuing care will be beyond the financial means of a large fraction of the
elderly, and they will naturally turn to government as the last-resort provider. It is
with this explosion of demand in mind that the Canadian Medical Association
recently came to emphasize the need for expanding the number of long-term care
facilities (CMA, 2010). This may or may not be the best or the only solution, but
13 According to Statistics Canada’s “M4 medium-growth projection scenario”, the
65-and-over population will increase from 5.0 million in 2011 to 10.2 million
in 2035, and the 85-and-over population from 675,000 in 2011 to 2,850,000
in 2050 (CANSIM Table 052-0005). New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada 223
there is clearly an urgent need to recognize the problem and to discuss intelligent
policy alternatives.
On family, the most important finding of recent decades is that early child-
hood plays a fundamental role in the building of human capital for the life cycle.
Neurology emphasizes three brain phenomena in the first few years of life: the
interconnection of neurons or synaptogenesis; the development of myelin; and
the expansion of glial cells. Psychology has found that brain development
responds to the kinds of environment to which young children are subjected,
and that traumas in early childhood can cause damage that is often difficult to
repair afterwards. As for economists, they have calculated that returns from
investment in early childhood are very large (Cunha et al., 2011, and Almond
and Currie, 2011). The benefit-cost ratio for this type of investment has been
estimated to be many times as large as the corresponding ratios for investment
in primary, secondary and college education.
In the past 15 years, Quebec has adopted a Scandinavian-type family policy
that has been explicitly motivated by these pieces of evidence from neurology,
psychology and economics. The Quebec package includes three programs.
First, since 1997 full-day kindergarten (the école maternelle) has been offered to
all 5-year-olds. Second, since 2000 an Educational Childcare (EC) program
has been offered to all children aged 0 to 4, initially at a reduced fee of $5 a day
and then at $7 since 2004, mainly through regulated early childhood centres
(centres de la petite enfance) and family-based child care. Before- and after-
school programs have also been made available at $7 a day to all primary-
school children. Third, since 2006 the province’s Parental Insurance Plan has
taken over administration of Employment Insurance parental leave benefits
and has significantly enhanced their level and duration. The three stated goals
of Quebec’s Educational Childcare Act are to “foster the development and
well-being of children, provide them with equality of opportunity, and help
parents reconcile their parental and professional responsibilities.” Access to
these programs is universal.224 New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada
Quebec’s $7-a-day EC program currently covers 50 per cent of all pre-
school children at an annual cost to the provincial government of $10,000 per
subsidized place.14 However, the favourable tax revenue feedback to provin-
cial and federal treasuries is so large that the reduced-fee program has been
estimated to more than pay for itself. The reason that the tax feedback is so
large is that the EC program has been hugely popular.15 Three recent micro-
econometric studies have suggested that it has had a major impact on mothers’
employment rates.16 Based on these studies, Luc Godbout, Suzie St-Cerny
and I have calculated that by 2008 Quebec’s EC program was responsible for
increases of 3.8 per cent in women’s aggregate employment and 1.7 per cent in
provincial GDP. A corollary of this finding is that every $1 of provincial
spending on EC generated $1.50 of additional tax revenue, including $1.05 for
the provincial government and $0.45 for the federal government (Fortin et al.,
2011).
Now, purely economic benefits are neither necessary nor sufficient for any
government program to be a good program. Quebec’s EC program clearly
helps parents “reconcile their parental and professional responsibilities”, but
it no doubt can still be improved in “fostering the development and well-being
of children and providing them with equality of opportunity”. Recent studies
of resources, organization and outcomes in early childhood centres suggest
that future efforts in Quebec should focus on enhancing the general quality of
EC services, particularly through improved training of personnel (see Japel et
al., 2005). In general, it is to be expected that disadvantaged children would on
average benefit more from EC programs than children from more advantaged
backgrounds.17 Fortunately, so far low-income working families participate in
Quebec’s EC program nearly as much as middle- and high-income working
families (66 per cent vs. 74 per cent) (Institut de la Statistique du Québec,
14 In the rest of Canada, the percentage of pre-school children in regulated care
was 21 per cent in 2008. See  Beach et al. (2009), Section 3, Table 9.
15 In 2009, 92 per cent of users of centre- and family-based regulated childcare
said that the EC program fully matched their preferences. See Institut de la
statistique du Québec (2011), Table 6.8.
16 They are: Baker et al. (2008), Lefebvre et al. (2009), ; Lefebvre et al. (2011).
17 Evidence for this proposition abounds. For Canada, see Baker (2011).New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada 225
2011, Table 6.1). In addition, Quebec offers special programs that target the
needs of children whose families are on social assistance.
An important question for Canada is therefore whether other parts of the
country should follow the universal, Scandinavian-type family policy Quebec
has adopted, or whether they should stick to EC programs that are purely tar-
geted at the at-risk children. My view is that Canada does not need to choose
between universality and targeting, but that it can have both at a bargain price.
If universality generates more tax revenue than expenditure, then with federal-
provincial cooperation the difference can be used to finance the high-quality
targeted interventions that are deemed most useful.
Furthermore, I see a number of reasons why a universal EC program is
desirable per se. First, the Quebec experience indicates that families strongly
prefer the current reduced-fee, regulated universal EC system over the tradi-
tional system, even with equivalent income tax deductions or credits.18 Sec-
ond, a universal EC program allows greater interaction between children from
middle- to high-income families and those from lower-income families. This
contributes to class rapprochement in the long run. Third, the message a uni-
versal EC program cum a parental leave program gives to young middle-class
families is that they do obtain something tangible in return for the taxes they
pay. This could help stabilize political support for social policy in general.
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